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Adjudicating Dignity:
Judicial Motivations and Justice Kennedy’s 
Jurisprudence of Dignity 
by ALLYSON C. YANKLE AND DANIEL TAGLIARINA*
They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law.  The 
Constitution grants them that right.1
- Justice Kennedy, Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) 
Introduction 
In Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges,2 the 
Supreme Court announced that the fundamental right to marriage extended 
to same sex marriages.  While the decision itself made headlines, there was 
a flurry of coverage concerning the importance of dignity inherent in the 
decision.  Some coverage of the Obergefell decision highlighted quotes from 
the majority and dissenting decisions with Kennedy’s line concerning equal 
dignity often grabbing top billing.3  Other writers, from diverse sources such 
as New Civil Rights Movement, The New Republic, Crisis Magazine, and 
commentary on the Heritage Foundation’s website, traced Kennedy’s use of 
?
        *      Allyson C. Yankle, Ph.D., is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at 
Lycoming College. Daniel Tagliarina, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor in Government and Politics 
at Utica College.  
 1.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). 
 2.  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 3.  E.g., The Editorial Board, A Profound Ruling Delivers Justice on Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES (June 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/opinion/a-profound-ruling-delivers-
justice-on-gay-marriage.html; Brian Levin, Our Love Is Equal: Justice Kennedy and Civil Rights,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 26, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/brian-levin-jd/our-love-is-
equal-justice_b_7673114.html; Adam B. Lerner, The Supreme Court’s Most Memorable Quotes 
on Gay Marriage, POLITICO (June 26, 2015), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/supreme-
court-justices-opinions-memorable-quotes-gay-marriage-119477.html (containing a remarkably 
straightforward title for our purposes).  
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dignity in Obergefell back to previous decisions.4  Some authors, from the 
National Review to Slate and The Atlantic, wrestled with the legal argument 
within the Kennedy decision as well as the possible far-reaching 
consequences and “undetermined legacy” about the right to dignity.5 While 
different outlets engaged in multiple ways with Kennedy’s usage of dignity, 
the media recognized the importance of dignity within the Obergefell
decision.
This concept, however, did not magically appear in the Obergefell
decision, or even in the earlier, related decision of United States v. Windsor.6
The constitutional argument for dignity has been a consistent principle for 
Kennedy dating back at least as far as his 1988 Senate confirmation hearings.  
Responding to a question from Senator Leahy concerning fundamental rights 
that are judicially enforceable, then-Judge Kennedy answered, “We look to 
the concepts of individuality and liberty and dignity that those who drafted 
the Constitution understood . . .  We see whether or not the right has been 
accepted as part of the rights of a free people in the historical interpretation 
of our own Constitution and the intentions of the framers.”7  He later 
elaborated that the right of human dignity could be considered based upon, 
“the injury to the person, the harm to the person, the anguish to the person, 
the inability of the person to manifest his or her own personality, the inability 
of a person to obtain his or her own self-fulfillment, [and] the inability of a 
person to reach his or her own potential.”8  What emerges from his Senate 
testimony is the concept of the right to human dignity and its relation to 
constitutional interpretation, privacy, equal protection, and due process 
rights.
?
 4.  E.g., Claude Summers, Justice Kennedy’s Jurisprudence of Dignity (June 7, 2016), 
https://www.thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/2016/06/new_blog; Eric Sasson, The LGBT 
Movement’s Supreme Court Hero: Anthony Kennedy, THE NEW REPUBLIC (June 26, 2015), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/122182/lgbt-movements-supreme-court-hero-anthony-kennedy;
Anthony Esolen, On Justice Kennedy’s Tenuous Grasp of Human Dignity, CRISIS MAGAZINE (July 
2, 2015), http://www.crisismagazine.com/2015/on-justice-kennedys-tenuous-grasp-of-human-
dignity; David Azerrad, Justice Kennedy and the Lonely Promethean Man of Liberalism, THE 
HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.heritage.org/node/1282/print-display.  
 5.  See, e.g., Howard Slugh, Justice Kennedy’s Judicial Power Grab, NAT’L REV. (July 1, 
2015), https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/07/obergefell-and-constitution/; Katherine Franke, 
“Dignity” Could Be Dangerous at the Supreme Court, SLATE (June 25, 2015), https://slate.com 
/human-interest/2015/06/in-the-scotus-same-sex-marriage-case-a-dignity-rationale-could-be-dang 
erous.html; Jeffrey Rosen, The Danger of a Constitutional “Right  to Dignity”, THE ATLANTIC
(Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-dangerous-doctrine-of-
dignity/391796/.
 6.  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 7.  Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 86 (1987) (testimony 
of Judge Anthony M. Kennedy).
 8.  Id.
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The legal community has not ignored Kennedy’s use and development 
of the right to dignity expanding across a range of case issue areas.  For 
instance, Siegel9 considers the use of dignity as the guiding structure of the 
undue burden test employed in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey10 and Gonzales v. Carhart.11  Broadly, she notes that 
Kennedy has utilized the concept of dignity in substantive due process and 
equal protection cases in three distinct ways to mean either life, liberty, or 
equality.12  Yoshino finds a similar relationship between substantive due 
process, liberty, and dignity.13  He argues that Kennedy’s use of dignity 
differs in Obergefell14 compared to Lawrence v. Texas,15 Casey,16 and 
Windsor17 when discussing the possibility of establishing a new form of 
equality in constitutional law.18  In a completely different direction, 
Althouse19 examines Kennedy’s use of dignity in relation to state’s rights 
and new federalism within the context of his decision in Alden v. Maine.20
While these case issue areas are distinct Tribe argues that for Kennedy “there 
is no significant gap between the older concept of dignity [found in 
Alden] . . . and the newer concept of dignity” in Obergefell.21  What 
Obergefell does, however, is mark the articulation of the doctrine of equal 
dignity based upon Kennedy’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause and 
Equal Protection Clause.22  Kennedy’s invocation of dignity in his written 
opinion is, thus, well documented in both the media and legal communities. 
Though there has been a great amount written about the content as well 
as methods of constitutional interpretation of Justice Kennedy’s legal 
decisions, we investigate how Kennedy has been able to develop and expand 
on legal concepts, such as dignity, on the Supreme Court.  To be clear, this 
?
 9.  Reva Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions under 
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008). 
 10.  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 11.  550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 12.  Siegel, supra note 9, at 1737. 
 13.  Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV.
FORUM 147 (2015). 
 14.  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 15.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 16.  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 17.  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 18.  Yoshino, supra note 13. 
 19.  Ann Althouse, On Dignity and Deference: The Supreme Court’s New Federalism, 68 U.
CIN. L. REV. 245 (2005). 
 20.  527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 21.  Lawrence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 16, 
22 (2015). 
 22.  Id.
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is not a story about Kennedy’s theory of constitutional interpretation or 
development of a legal doctrine.  Rather, we use Kennedy’s opinions as a 
case study to examine how institutional position on the Supreme Court 
allows median justices to look beyond policy goals and consider legal goals 
and motivations in their decision-making.  Drawing primarily on scholarship 
concerning legal motivation and the decision-making of Supreme Court 
median justices, we argue that Kennedy’s institutional position as median 
justice allows him to articulate and advance the legal concept of dignity.  Our 
goal for this paper is to better understand the institutional importance of the 
median justice in shaping legal language through the examination of 
Kennedy’s use, articulation, and application of dignity.
I.  Justice Kennedy and Dignity:
The Influence of Institutional Position and Legal Motivations 
Our analysis engages with theories about the behavior of the median 
justice and how median justices may be effective in pursuing legal 
motivations and goals while on the bench. Studies concerning judicial 
behavior have typically focused on judicial votes across terms or case issue 
areas to explain outcomes in the decisions or understanding how certain 
justices may vote.  While this type of research may give a broad perspective 
to the mechanisms of the theories, we choose a different approach.  
Specifically, we start from the perspective that “institutional settings are an 
omnipresent feature of our attempts to pursue a preferred course of action” 
and that “different contexts make it more or less possible for individuals to 
act on different sets of beliefs.”23
To accomplish this, we focus on one single justice—Justice Kennedy. 
We examine where he has invoked and articulated his concept of dignity, 
cross-referenced with his institutional position on the Supreme Court, to 
show how his institutional position has aided his approach and allowed him 
to pursue legal motivations.  First, we review the current literature about 
Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence in addition to research from judicial politics 
concerning median justices and legal goals and motivations.  Next, we 
introduce our methodology and data before presenting our analysis.  Finally, 
we highlight the key patterns we find that suggest the importance of 
institutional position by demonstrating Kennedy’s consistent use of dignity, 
which also increases when Kennedy is the median justice especially in 
majority opinions in narrowly decided cases. 
?
 23.  HOWARD GILLMAN & CORNELL W. CLAYTON, Introduction, in SUPREME COURT 
DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 3 (Howard Gillman & Cornell W. 
Clayton eds., 1999). 
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A.  Justice Kennedy and Looking for “Dignity” 
In the introduction, we noted that multiple legal scholars examined 
Justice Kennedy’s use of dignity in his opinions, but that political scientists 
have not paid as great of attention to his use of dignity as a legal concept.  
While we are only using Kennedy’s opinions as a case study, we would be 
remiss to ignore the valuable insights scholars have made into the justice’s 
method of interpretation.  This includes two key studies24 concerning his 
method of constitutional interpretation (or lack thereof) and jurisprudence of 
liberty that address dignity as a part of liberty.  While Justice Kennedy is 
often portrayed as a justice that draws criticism for not having a cohesive 
jurisprudential philosophy, both challenge this portrayal by focusing on the 
importance of liberty in Kennedy’s decisions and providing a cohesion to his 
jurisprudence despite his own protestations otherwise.  Importantly for us, 
this work demonstrates the influence of dignity within Kennedy’s 
jurisprudence.
Drawing on individual liberties cases, Knowles argues that Kennedy’s 
jurisprudence is consistent and moderately libertarian consisting of three 
elements.25  First, there is the belief in the toleration of different viewpoints 
by the government; second, the importance of dignity in relation to personal 
liberty against government attempts to classify individuals; and third, 
personal responsibility that allows some government interference due to the 
relation between rights and responsibility.26  She argues that Kennedy’s use 
of dignity is based on the “libertarian belief that an individual’s dignity is 
violated by government actions that treat that person in a particular way 
because of their possession of a certain characteristic.”27  For Knowles, the 
emphasis on dignity informs the humane aspect of Kennedy’s jurisprudence 
and corresponds with individual autonomy (liberty) to determine their own 
identity. 
Similarly, Colucci argues that Kennedy has a cohesive jurisprudence 
that focuses on the importance of liberty and, like Knowles, sees dignity as 
being a part of liberty.28  He characterizes Kennedy as believing “that the 
Western concepts of liberty and human dignity serve as foundations for the 
U.S. Constitution” and that “this conception of liberty requires judicial 
sensitivity to the many ways in which government actions . . . can prevent 
?
 24.  FRANK J. COLUCCI, JUSTICE KENNEDY’S JURISPRUDENCE: THE FULL AND NECESSARY 
MEANING OF LIBERTY (2009); HELEN J. KNOWLES, THE TIE GOES TO FREEDOM: JUSTICE 
ANTHONY M. KENNEDY ON LIBERTY (2009). 
 25.  KNOWLES, supra note 24, at 36–48. 
 26.  Id.
 27.  Id. at 198. 
 28.  COLUCCI, supra note 24 passim.
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individuals from fully developing their own personalities.”29  Unlike 
Knowles, Colucci extends his analysis of Kennedy’s usage of dignity beyond 
individual rights to issues arising under federalism and separation of powers.  
Kennedy’s use of dignity in this realm of case law comes to the federal 
government respecting individual autonomy; however, it is state sovereignty 
and not individuals that must be respected.30
Both Colucci and Knowles raise the importance of dignity within 
Kennedy’s jurisprudence.31  According to Colucci and Knowles, dignity is 
part of how Kennedy considers liberty and is a central part of his judicial 
philosophy and process of decision making.32  While many justices claim to 
be motivated by a concern for protecting liberty, dignity, as its own legal 
concept, seems to be unique to Kennedy.  Colucci and Knowles both 
acknowledge that Kennedy cares about dignity, but they do not emphasize 
this as a unique legal concern for Kennedy.  This is where we break from 
this informative work.  Dignity is not the core of Kennedy’s overarching 
judicial philosophy, but rather is a legal concept that he believes belongs in 
American law, that is already present in law, and he tries to shape what it 
means for the American political system.  He informed the Senate Judiciary 
Committee of this fact during his confirmation hearings and, as we explain 
later in this piece, he discusses it in written decisions in almost every term 
he served on the Supreme Court.  We argue that he has been able to pursue 
the further articulation of dignity because he is the median justice. 
Our analysis focuses on this specific concept rather than the broader 
concept of liberty because entrenching dignity within case law is, in many 
ways, a more tangible goal than shifting philosophical and legal notions of 
liberty.  Moreover, as a study about a median justice’s pursuit of legal goals 
and concepts, dignity is prevalent throughout Kennedy’s jurisprudence, 
presented clearly in his opinions, and is more uniquely a province of 
Kennedy’s writings, compared to other justices, than liberty is.  Taken 
together, this suggests that dignity is important to Kennedy, that it is possible 
to trace this specific concept through his opinions, and that it is a legal goal 
that is peculiar to him.  Consequently, dignity, as Kennedy’s unique legal 
concern, allows us to investigate our claims regarding the institutional 
position of median justices.  As is noted in the literature (and discussed 
below), median justices often demonstrate behavior different from their 
peers.  Looking at Kennedy as an example of a median justice, and dignity 
rather than the more expansive concept of liberty, allows us to investigate 
?
 29. COLUCCI, supra note 24 at 35. 
 30.  Id. at 168. 
 31.  See generally COLUCCI, supra note 24; see generally KNOWLES, supra note 24. 
 32.  See generally COLUCCI, supra note 24; see generally KNOWLES, supra note 24. 
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the importance of the median justice’s institutional position for legal 
motivations. 
B.  Median Justice 
We seek to explain why the institutional position of the median justice 
matters for obtaining legal goals and content by looking at one specific 
justice and one specific goal.  Within the context of judicial decision-making, 
there is the assumption that the median justice influences the majority 
opinion.33  This influence makes understanding the median justice important 
for understanding the decision-making process on the Court, as well as the 
ultimate rulings the Court issues.  However, we must first address what is 
meant by “median” justice and how this relates to decision-making. 
There are two popular conceptions of median justice in the literature.  
On the one hand, the median justice is conceptualized as when a justice is an 
ideological swing vote and crosses the ideological divide or voting blocs.  
Studies that have considered swing justice have looked at the behavior of a 
specific justice being the crucial vote—being the most likely to be in the 
majority of ideologically divergent groups of justices—in cases decided by 
a 5-4 vote.34  On the other hand, the median justice may also be the middle 
justice based upon a specific term’s ideological spectrum.35
While we primarily focus on the idea of the median justice based on a 
term’s specific ideological spectrum, we also pay attention to voting blocs in 
narrowly decided cases.  We primarily focus on the ideological middle point 
as this person is, inherently, the balancing point for potential ideological 
shifts in rulings.  Any 5-4 ruling that breaks along ideological lines would 
see the median justice as the one logically most likely to shift the balance.  
Of course, not all 5-4 rulings are decided strictly on ideology, as other issues 
could intervene to lead to different voting blocs.  For this reason we also 
consider the importance of narrowly divided cases, as we would expect the 
median justice—in this case acting as a swing justice—to have the most sway 
on the ultimate content of the opinion as the other justices in the majority 
could not afford to lose the “swing” vote, and with it their majority coalition.  
?
 33.  See THOMAS H. HAMMOND ET AL., STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND POLICY CHOICE ON THE 
U.S. SUPREME COURT (2005); Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median Justice on the United States 
Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275 (2005). 
 34.  See, e.g., Janet L. Blasecki, Justice Lewis F. Powell: Swing Voter or Staunch 
Conservative?, 52 THE J. OF POLITICS 530 (1990); Patrick D. Schmidt & David A. Yalof, The 
“Swing Voter” Revisited: Justice Anthony Kennedy and the First Amendment Right of Free Speech,
57 POLITICAL RES. Q. 209 (2004). 
 35.  See generally Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POLITICAL ANALYSIS 134 
(2002) (creating and justifying a measure of judicial ideology that situates justices into an 
ideological spectrum, with measures for each justice specific to each Court term). 
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In our analysis below we provide data on term median justices, as well as 
draw attention to where Kennedy uses dignity in closely divided cases. 
As applied by the attitudinal model, all justices—whether at the 
ideological extremes or middle of the spectrum—will vote according to their 
ideological preferences.36  Research, however, suggests that the median 
justice—regardless of how it is defined—is less likely to rely on simple 
ideological considerations than their colleagues on the ideological wings of 
the Court.  This may help to explain the lack of voting consistency37 and 
variance in the magnitude of ideological voting.38  Building upon these 
insights of the decision making of the median justice, we argue that the 
median justice is particularly well situated to pursue legal goals and 
motivations, and not just policy preferences and ideological considerations. 
Even with difference in definition, multiple studies have demonstrated 
that numerous factors influence the decision-making of median justices that 
go beyond personal policy preferences.  In their study of Kennedy acting as 
the swing justice, Schmidt and Yalof39 raise the idea that a swing voter on 
the Court may emerge based upon ideology, facts of the case, or internal 
institutional factors.  More broadly, median justices who function as 
ideological swing justices may vote in an unexpected ideological direction 
due to greater reliance on case-specific factors,40 the presence of the Solicitor 
General as a party,41 oral arguments,42 and controlling precedent and legal 
facts of the case.43  Likewise, justices that are towards the ideological median 
?
 36.  See JEFFREY ALLAN SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). 
 37.  See Paul M. Collins, The Consistency of Judicial Choice, 70 THE J. OF POLITICS 861 
(2008).
 38.  See Brandon L. Bartels, Choices in Context: How Case-Level Factors Influence the 
Magnitude of Ideological Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court, 39 AMERICAN POLITICS RES. 142 
(2011).
 39.  See Schmidt & Yalof, supra note 34. 
 40.  See Peter K. Enns & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, The Swing Justice, 75 THE J. OF POLITICS
1089 (2013). 
 41.  See, e.g., Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Solicitor General Influence and Agenda 
Setting on the U.S. Supreme Court, 64 POLITICAL RES. Q. 765 passim (2011). 
 42.  See, e.g., Timothy R. Johnson et al., The Influence of Oral Arguments on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 100 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCI. REV. 99 passim (2006). 
 43.  See, e.g., Michael A. Bailey & Forrest Maltzman, Does Legal Doctrine Matter? 
Unpacking Law and Policy Preferences on the U.S. Supreme Court, 102 AMERICAN POLITICAL
SCI. REV. 369 passim (2008); see MICHAEL A BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE
CONSTRAINED COURT: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE passim (2011); see
Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court: The Collision of Policy 
and Jurisprudence, 71 THE J. OF POLITICS 1062 passim (2009). 
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during a term may be influenced by public opinion,44 legal considerations,45
or other strategic influences.46
As a whole, the literature on median justices suggests that justices in 
this institutional position are more likely to take into account other factors 
beyond personal policy preferences.  This leads us to argue that ideologically 
median justices are not only more likely to consider factors other than policy 
preferences, but also are likely to use their position as the middle point of the 
Court to shape judicial opinions to reflect their legal considerations.  In terms 
of Kennedy, our example of a median justice in this paper, we expect him to 
write dignity into his legal opinions most often when he is serving as the 
ideological middle point of the Court, and even more so when he is also in 
the majority of a narrowly divided case.  Thus, when the median justice is 
“median” in both common uses of the term, this justice is most enabled to 
pursue legal motivations, and we expect to see evidence of this in their 
written opinions. 
One final debate concerning the median justice within the literature that 
we need to address is who counts as the median justice.  Studies have 
investigated particular justices to understand if their voting behavior 
identifies said justice as the median justice, in terms of the ideological swing 
vote, on the Supreme Court.  These studies focus on one particular justice, 
such as Justice Powell47 and Justice Kennedy.48  More commonly, however, 
scholars have utilized ideological scores to identify the swing justices on the 
Supreme Court.  This effort has been led by Martin and Quinn49 to estimate 
ideal points of justices’ policy preferences over time.  The Martin-Quinn 
scores in particular are important for identifying the probability that a justice 
is the median justice in a given term.50
This split within the literature demonstrates the flexibility of the term 
“median justice” such that it could apply to judicial behavior, as is the case 
when median means “swing’ vote, or it could mean ideological middle point, 
as is the case with Martin-Quinn scores and studies utilizing these.  While 
our research does focus on a specific justice, we do not assume that Kennedy 
is the median justice in all of the cases.  Instead, we examine his institutional 
?
 44.  See William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and 
Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 THE J. OF POLITICS 169 (1996). 
 45.  See Black & Owens, supra note 41; see Enns & Wohlfarth, supra note 40; see Mark J. 
Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making, 96 
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCI. REV. 305 (2002). 
 46.  See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998). 
 47.  See, e.g., Blasecki, supra note 34 
 48.  See, e.g., Schmidt & Yalof, supra note 34. 
 49.  Martin & Quinn, supra note 35. 
 50.  Id. at 151. 
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position on the Supreme Court as it relates to his use of the right to human 
dignity in his decisions.51  We look at both ideological positioning and 
closely decided cases to try to account for both related uses of the term 
“median justice” within the literature. 
C.  Judicial Motivations 
Traditionally, judicial decision-making scholarship has advocated that 
judges are motivated by their policy preferences.  Whether or not they may 
pursue their sincere or sophisticated preferences has been a key question in 
the debate between attitudinal and strategic models of behavior, but both 
have nevertheless emphasized justices and policy goals.  As Baum cautions, 
even when policy goals seems to be the dominate goal, “legal considerations 
could affect the content of opinions to a greater, and more measureable, 
degree than they affect votes.”52  In other words, legal goals and motivations 
may be a factor in the decision-making, but appear more in the construction 
and details of the opinions rather than the votes themselves.  For this reason, 
it is even more important to look at the content of opinions.  Moreover, 
regardless of the mechanism of decision making used, judicial opinions 
shape the law after the case leaves the Court.  In order to find evidence of 
judicial attempts to shape the law through legal considerations, it is necessary 
to examine the written opinions. 
The conceptualization of legal motivations as simply seeking legal 
accuracy and/or legal clarity might be shortsighted and underdeveloped.  For 
instance, there is the argument that external satisfaction, such as gaining 
reputation, could be related to legal motivations where judges that want to 
be perceived as influencers on the court and therefore may be less willing to 
follow precedent.53  Alternatively, it may be simply that, “the value of 
working within the existing body of law can be an important feature of a 
craft orientation to judging.”54  Other works have considered personal 
attributes of justices, such as reputation creators or esteems grantors as 
influencing behavior and adherence to precedent.55  What becomes clear is 
?
 51.  Table A in the Appendix specifically charts the term median justice for Kennedy’s time 
on the Court, as well as the number and types of cases in which Kennedy invoked dignity each 
term.  
 52.  LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 71 (1997). 
 53.  See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR (2008); Gilat Levy, Careerist Judges and the Appeals Process, 36 RAND J. OF 
ECONOMICS 275 (2005). 
 54.  Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Reconsidering Judicial Preferences, 16 ANN. REV. OF 
POLITICAL SCI. 11, 20–21 (2013). 
 55.  Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial 
Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 629 (2000). 
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that first, it is necessary to consider beyond policy-seeking goals and second, 
legal motivations are a useful place to start but that scholars should go 
beyond legal clarity and accuracy in their conceptualization. 
Part of this increased attention paid to the effects of legal rules, doctrine, 
and precedents coincides with an emphasis to remember that the “law is both 
legal and political”56 still takes into account the “jurisprudence” aspect in the 
study of political jurisprudence.57  This effort to bring in law as a factor in 
decision-making has led to the development of the doctrinal politics 
approach, which seeks to reconcile legal realist, behavioral, and strategic 
approaches to judicial politics.58  He articulates that the doctrinal politics 
approach is organized around four key points: (1) greater recognition of 
judicial structures, which emphasizes “legal cases as the vehicles for policy 
making” and further integrates “the practice of law with a political, policy-
seeking perspective”; (2) more investigation about the “content and structure 
of judicial preferences and legal opinions”; (3) focus more on the interaction 
between legality and hierarchy; and, (4) examining “how judges use doctrine 
to get what they want.”59
This doctrinal politics approach goes beyond judicial votes and argues 
for a case-space model which “highlights legal cases as the vehicles for 
policy making” by “integrating the practice of law with a political, policy-
seeking perspective.”60  In particular, Lax proposes understanding how 
judges make policy using legal rules, or doctrinal instrumentalism, as well 
as looking at the use of precedents and theories of interpretation as ways to 
affect behavior and outcomes.61  This is similar to the theoretical and 
empirical considerations with which Tiller and Cross62 engage, including 
looking at the decision structures found within opinions and how legal 
doctrine may mirror judicial motivations. 
Posner argues that a judge’s response is a combination of factors of 
legal doctrine, institutional constraints, policy preferences, and strategic 
considerations among other factors.63  Here, Posner describes the judicial 
?
 56.  Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What is Legal Doctrine?, 100 NW. L. REV. 517, 528 
(2006).
 57.  See Martin Shapiro, Political Jurisprudence, 52 KY. L.J. 294 (1963); C. Herman Pritchett, 
The Development of Judicial Research, FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RES. (Joel Grossman & Joseph 
Tannenhaus eds., 1969). 
 58.  See Jeffrey R. Lax, The New Judicial Politics of Legal Doctrine, 14 ANN. REV. OF 
POLITICAL SCI.131 (2011). 
 59.  Id. at 133–34. 
 60.  Id. at 133. 
 61.  Id. at 135–36. 
 62.  Tiller & Cross, supra note 56, at 528–30. 
 63.  See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (First Harvard University Press 
paperback ed. 2010). 
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decision-making process as involving a variety of factors, including 
considerations not always factored in to political science literature on 
decision making, which echoes Baum’s64 insights.  We take seriously the 
contention that institutional context influences decision-making.  
Specifically, building on the median justice’s behavior, legal motivations, 
and judicial decision-making literature, we argue that median justices are 
more likely to pursue legal motivations and write their ideas into the law than 
other justices.  Furthermore, we expect this will be particularly evident in 
narrowly divided decisions where median justices have greater institutional 
status to craft their decision and clearly articulate their legal goals.  As a 
means of testing our hypotheses, we turn to Kennedy and his development 
of the legal concept of dignity as a case involving a specific median justice 
interested in a specific legal concept. 
II.  Methodology and Data 
While literature about a median justice’s behavior and his or her legal 
motivations may seem disconnected at first, we argue that findings about 
median justices on the Supreme Court suggest that a justice in this 
institutional position may be ripe for studying legal motivations and goals.  
First, median justices are more likely to consider other factors, including 
legal implications, when making their decisions.  Second, judicial decision-
making at the Court level traditionally shows that justices are concerned with 
policy outcomes, but median justices appear to be different and are less likely 
to rely on ideological considerations and personal policy preferences than 
the other justices.65  If median justices are less likely to rely on their own 
policy preferences, what are other possible motivations beyond policy?  One 
suggested answer has been a median justice’s legal motivations and goals 
with more attention given to understanding the importance legal rules, 
doctrine, and precedents in judicial behavior.66  If legal goals, meaning legal 
rules, precedent, or doctrine affect behavior, it is necessary to understand the 
circumstances that allow justices to pursue those goals beyond simple policy 
decisions.
We posit that institutional position—specifically that of median 
justices—places some justices in a better position to pursue their legal goals 
than other justices on the Court.  To do this, we focus on a single justice and 
a unique legal concept: Justice Kennedy and his concept of dignity.  Prior 
studies of Kennedy have noted his use of dignity within his interpretation of 
?
 64.  See generally BAUM, supra note 53. 
 65.  See generally Enns & Wohlfarth, supra note 40. 
 66.  See, e.g., Epstein & Knight, supra note 54 passim; see generally Lax, supra note 58; see 
generally Tiller & Cross, supra note 56. 
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liberty, but the focus has been more on his methods of constitutional 
interpretation and jurisprudence.67  We make no claims about Kennedy’s 
method of interpretation nor the development of a legal doctrine.  Rather, we 
trace a specific legal concept that Kennedy has articulated since his 
confirmation hearing and demonstrate how his shifting institutional position 
on the Court has allowed him to pursue a legal goal and expand the concept 
of dignity. 
For this analysis, we adopt a qualitative approach that utilizes a content 
analysis.  To do this, we analyze all of Kennedy’s written opinions from 
when he joined the Court in 1988 through the end of the Court’s 2017-2018 
term, coinciding with his retirement from the Court.  Across this 30-year 
period, Kennedy wrote 545 discrete opinions for the Court.  However, we 
include only the opinions for which Kennedy signed his name.  Thus, we 
exclude from our analysis per curium opinions and joined opinions.  We 
want to investigate Kennedy’s use of his institutional position to aid his 
articulation of a legal concept regarding dignity, and thus restrict our analysis 
to his signed opinions.  One important point to make is that we did include 
both Planned Parenthood v. Casey68 and National Federation of 
Independent Businesses v. Sebelius (NFIB).69  These cases deserve special 
mention as Kennedy coauthored the plurality opinion in Casey with Justices 
O’Connor and Souter, and he coauthored a dissent with Justice Scalia in 
NFIB.  In NFIB, Kennedy claimed authorship over these opinions, even if it 
was shared authorship, we included them in review of Kennedy’s opinions. 
We subsequently searched all 545 Supreme Court opinions authored by 
Kennedy for use of the word, “dignity,” or related words, including 
“dignitary,” “dignified,” “indignity,” and “indignation.”  We believe that 
these words are similar enough to “dignity” that they were worth including 
in our examination to be sure we were catching multiple ways in which 
Kennedy could be articulating his stance on dignity.  Of these opinions, 54 
contained at least one use of dignity or one of our identified related terms.  
Specifically, 48 of them make use of dignity, five use “indignity” or 
“indignities,” and the remaining case uses “indignation.”  These 54 cases 
count for approximately 10% (9.9%) of Kennedy’s written opinions.70
?
 67.  See COLUCCI, supra note 24; see also KNOWLES, supra note 24. 
 68.  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 69.  132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 70.  We limit our analysis to “dignity” and the closely related “indignity,” “indignities,” and 
“indignation” to let us focus on Kennedy’s legal concept of dignity.  We are not trying to fully 
articulate Kennedy’s concept of dignity in all of its theoretical richness, but rather, we are using the 
concept as a means of studying a legal goal of a median justice.  We do not expand our search to 
potentially related terms, such as “honor,” “respect,” or “decency.”  We hope to explore these 
concepts more in our future research.  
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III.  Analysis and Discussion 
Kennedy’s use of dignity stretches across a variety of opinion types and 
issues.  Most of Kennedy’s uses of dignity come in his majority opinions71
(38 of the 54 cases,72 including Kennedy’s co-authored plurality opinion in 
Casey 73).  Additionally, in 32 of the 54 cases, Kennedy is the only justice to 
invoke dignity in any of the Court’s opinions.  In cases, such as U.S. v. 
Windsor74 and Obergefell v. Hodges75, where Kennedy writes for the 
majority, the other justices who use dignity do so in dissent, typically in 
direct quotes from Kennedy’s majority opinion and often while critiquing 
Kennedy’s reasoning.  These numbers suggest that Kennedy works on his 
own conception of dignity that is unique to his jurisprudence.  He often 
engages in the sole use of the phrase, and when other justices use “dignity,” 
it is often to address Kennedy’s usage of the term.  This suggests Kennedy 
is discussing dignity in a way unique to him and that studying these uses 
helps us capture the pursuit of legal goals by a median justice. 
Using the Supreme Court Database76 for issue coding, we see that 
Kennedy uses dignity in a variety of areas, but most often to discuss equal 
protection, due process, and privacy.77  Table 1 presents the case breakdown 
by issue area and legal provision for the cases where Kennedy discusses 
dignity. 
?
 71.  To simplify distinctions, we counted opinions for the Court as “majority,” even if, 
technically, they were plurality opinions, as was the case in Casey.
 72.  Of the 54 opinions where Kennedy invoked dignity or one of its related terms, 38 of them 
were majority opinions, three were regular concurring opinions, three were concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment, four were concurring in the judgment, and the remaining six opinions 
were dissenting opinions.  
 73.  See generally Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 
 74.  See generally U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 75.  See generally Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 76.  Harold J. Spaeth et al., 2018 Supreme Court Database, Version 2017 Release 2, SUPREME
COURT DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org (last visited March 16, 2019).  
 77.  The data in Table 1, using the coding from the Supreme Court Database, id., reflects all 
of Kennedy’s opinions during his tenure on the Supreme Court.  
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Table 1: Cases Containing “Dignity” 
Case Issue Area N Law at Issue N
Criminal Procedure 17 Infrequently Litigated Statute 7
Civil Rights 12
Fourteenth Amendment (Due 
Process) 6
Privacy 7 Fourth Amendment 6
First Amendment 5 
Fourteenth Amendment (Equal 
Protection) 5
Economic Activity 4 
First Amendment (Speech, Press, 
Assembly) 5
Federalism 3 
Eighth Amendment (Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment) 4
Judicial Power 2 Eleventh Amendment 3
Due Process 2 Americans with Disabilities Act 2
Attorneys 1 Habeas Corpus 2
Miscellaneous 1 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2
 No Entry in Database 2
Article III (Case and Controversy 
Requirement) 1
Fifth Amendment (Equal 
Protection) 1
Sixth Amendment (right to trial 
by jury) 1
 Fifteenth Amendment (Other) 1
Clean Air Act 1
Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts 
(42 U.S.C. § 1983) 
1
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Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act 1
Sherman Act  1
Interstate Compact 1
First Amendment (free exercise 
of religion) 1
Total 54 Total 54
In Table 1, we can see that Kennedy’s use of dignity occurs most often 
in cases that deal with government interference in private lives (search and 
seizure and privacy cases), as well as how the government treats us relative 
to our personhood (abortion, cruel and unusual punishment, and race-based 
discrimination). 
Kennedy employs the language of dignity when it comes to government 
interference in our lives.  He also uses dignity when discussing governmental 
actions that run the risk of degrading who we are or the intrinsic value of 
human life.  This allows Kennedy to link issues to dignity that, without this 
concept, might otherwise seem to be separate considerations.  For example, 
Kennedy’s conception of dignity allows him to call for the humane treatment 
of prisoners,78 question certain death penalty practices,79 reject certain 
abortion restrictions while upholding others,80 reject sex-based and race-
based use of preemptory challenges,81 and question the harm done by 
embracing affirmative action policies.82  Furthermore, these issues all share 
the central concern expressed in three of Kennedy’s most prominent cases 
involving dignity, Lawrence v. Texas,83 U.S v. Windsor,84 and Obergefell v. 
?
 78.  See generally Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474 (2010); Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 
(2011).
 79.  See generally Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 
407 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 80.  See generally Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Ohio v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, 497 US 502 (1990); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
 81.  See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); J.E.B. v. Alabama 
ex rel. TB, 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
 82.  See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 579 U.S. 14 (2016); Parents Involved in 
Cmty. Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 
495 (2000); Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
 83.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 84.  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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Hodges.85  The central concern in these cases is the damage done to dignity 
when we start to criminalize or otherwise discriminate against people’s core 
identity, which in these specific cases pertains to gays and lesbians.86
Despite the rather wide range of topics, for Kennedy, each case raises 
concerns about issues of dignity, and we see his efforts to articulate these 
views about human dignity in his decisions. 
As shown in Table 2, for Kennedy, dignity involves issues of limiting 
how and when the government can become involved in the lives of 
individuals.  This, we label as “government interference,” which shows up 
in issues of privacy, personal identity, and questions touching on the value 
of human life.  However, Kennedy’s use of dignity in his opinions also 
appears in issues regarding what we are calling “institutional dignity,” which 
pertains to sovereignty and the law.  Table 2 summarizes these two forms of 
dignity. 







(personal choices regarding 
sex and marriage, limited 
access to abortion, protection 
from unreasonable search and 
seizures), personal identity
(non-discrimination on the 
basis of personal identifying 
characteristics, such as race, 
sex, or sexual orientation), and 
preservation of the value of 
human life (death penalty and 
abortion limitations, and 
requirements of human 
treatment of prisoners) 
1) Obergefell v. 
Hodges (2015)87
2) Powers v. Ohio
(1991)88
3) Roper v. Simmons
(2005)89
?
 85.  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 86.  We hesitate to go further than Kennedy actually does in any of these cases and refer to 
rights for the entire LGBT community as transgender individuals, in particular, have largely been 
left out of recent Court victories for gays and lesbians. 
 87.  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 88.  499 U.S. 400 (1991). 
 89.  543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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Institutional
Dignity 
Full acknowledgment and 
respect of sovereignty (fair 
and equal treatment of 
sovereign entities, including 
sovereign immunity) and of 
court and the legal profession
(considerations over 
maintaining the legitimacy and 
majesty of our legal system)  
1) Idaho v. Coeur 
D'Alene Tribe of 
Idaho (1997)90
2) Williams-Yulee v. 
The Florida Bar
(2015)91
As mentioned, Kennedy develops dignity within the law not only in 
regard to government interference, but also in cases pertaining to 
institutional dignity, primarily around government structures and bodies.  In 
these cases related to a structural part of the government, Kennedy uses 
dignity to refer to the dignity owed to coequal sovereigns.  An example of 
this in Kennedy’s opinions in Tenth Amendment cases about respect the 
dignity of states as coequal sovereigns with the national government.  
Kennedy also invokes this notion of institutional dignity when writing about 
the dignity that needs to be preserved in and for our legal system, as happens 
in a case discussing civil forfeitures related to when defendants flee the 
country.  As an example of the first use, consider Kennedy’s majority 
opinion in Alden v. Maine.92 Alden involves questions about the degree of 
applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state probations officers and, 
more specifically, whether these officers can bring suit in federal courts.  As 
a sovereign immunity case involving conflict between the national 
government’s attempts to force states to follow federal employment 
standards and states’ ability to control their own employment standards for 
state employees, Kennedy discusses the importance of sovereignty and 
respecting the dignity of the states.  Kennedy writes: 
Federalism requires that Congress accord States the respect and 
dignity due [to] them as residuary sovereigns and joint participants 
in the Nation’s governance.  Immunity from suit in federal courts 
is not enough to preserve that dignity, for the indignity of 
subjecting a nonconsenting State to the coercive process of 
judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties exists regardless 
of the forum.93
?
 90.  521 U.S. 261 (1997). 
 91.  135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). 
 92.  527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 93.  Alden, 527 U.S. at 711. 
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Here, we see Kennedy invoke dignity as an important part of our federal 
system and as a way to analyze how sovereign entities interact in general.  
Kennedy not only talks about the need for “respect and dignity,” but also 
talks about what is needed to “preserve that dignity” and avoid “the 
indignity” of forcing rules on sovereign entities.  In this sense, dignity echoes 
what Kennedy is setting up for individuals—equal treatment, liberty, and 
protection from coercive governmental overreach—only applying it to state.  
This suggests that, for Kennedy, dignity applies to sovereignty as it applies 
to individual autonomy, and in both cases, dignity is about protecting some 
inherent characteristic of an individual entity. 
Kennedy provides an example of the second use of institutional dignity 
as well.  Instead of preserving power and respect for sovereigns, we see 
Kennedy express concern for integral parts of our governmental structure, 
often courts and the legal system.  This is on display in Kennedy’s majority 
opinion in Degen v. U.S.94  The petitioner, Brian J. Degen, who has dual 
citizenship with the U.S. and Switzerland, was living in Switzerland at the 
time that he was indicted under charges related to alleged drug dealings.95
Additionally, the U.S. government sought to forfeit property Degen owned 
in three different states under the claim that Degen either purchased the 
proper with money from his drug dealings, or he used the property to 
facilitate drug sales.96  Degen refused to return to answer the criminal 
charges, and he cannot be extradited back to the U.S.97  He did, however, try 
to challenge the forfeiture proceedings in a separate civil matter.98  The 
district court granted summary judgment for the state, and the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed, through application of the “fugitive disentitlement doctrine” that 
bars those outside of the country who refuse to answer for criminal charges 
to pursue legal claims while they are fugitives.99
Kennedy spends time in his opinion considering what enforcing this 
rule means for the “dignity” of the court and for the “indignity” visited upon 
the courts by fugitives and their legal claims.100  He emphasizes these points 
near the end of his opinion when he asserts: 
It remains the case, however, that the sanction of disentitlement is 
most severe and so could disserve the dignitary purposes for 
?
 94.  517 U.S. 820 (1996). 
 95.  Id. at 822. 
 96.  Id. at 821. 
 97.  Id.
 98.  Id.
 99.  Degen, 517 U.S. at 821–22. 
 100.  Id.
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which it is invoked.  The dignity of a court derives from the respect 
accorded its judgments.  That respect is eroded, not enhanced, by 
too free a recourse to rules foreclosing consideration of claims on 
the merits.101
Kennedy ultimately reverses and remands the grant of summary 
judgment for further consideration.102  But, in so doing, as the above quote 
shows, he wrestles with preserving the “dignity” of courts and what best 
preserves this “dignitary” interest.  Although maintaining the dignity of 
courts is incredibly important, Kennedy feels the respect that derives from 
the dignity of the courts is harmed more by refusing to consider the merits 
of a case than by allowing fugitives to bring claims in court.  Not only does 
Kennedy consider the dignity of the court, he imparts his own understanding 
of what best serves this dignity into the legal doctrine he is shaping. 
Again, this is similar to how he uses dignity in the context of 
individuals, where spousal notifications for abortion go against a woman’s 
dignity and autonomy,103 but parental notifications for minors with a judicial 
waiver do not.104  Both raise concerns regarding preserving dignity, and in 
both cases Kennedy acts as the arbiter of how best to protect dignity (and 
what valid dignity interests even are).  Kennedy’s use of dignity expands 
beyond just concern over individual human dignity to include considerations 
of the dignity that is part of sovereignty or part of governing institutions, 
with 15 of his dignity opinions addressing issues of sovereignty and respect 
for our institutions (8 on sovereignty and 7 on institutional dignity), yet he 
does so in ways that are largely consistent with how he presents individual 
dignity concerns.  Dignity regarding government interference is a broader 
concept for Kennedy, involving the preservation of individual respect and 
autonomy.  Institutional dignity is about preserving sovereignty, maintaining 
a coequal position between states and the national government, and is also 
about what institutions are owed, or afforded.  This makes both types of 
dignity about preserving inherent qualities in both individuals and 
institutions.105  Thus, despite the two iterations, dignity appears to be a 
largely legally consistent concept for Kennedy, about preserving and 
protecting inherent value and worth for both individuals and state entities, 
albeit when Kennedy believes doing so is consistent with the law. 
?
 101.  Degen, 517 U.S. at 828. 
 102.  Id.
 103.  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 104.  Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 US 502, 531 (1990). 
 105.  For more support of this claim, see the Appendix for information pertaining to KWIC 
analysis of both types of Kennedy’s dignity opinions.  
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Kennedy’s institutional position as the median justice on the Court also 
contributes to his ability to formulate and express his concept of dignity. Of 
the 30 full terms covered in our study, Kennedy was likely the median justice 
for 16.5 of those terms (the half term is because O’Connor was the median 
justice in 2005 until her retirement, at which point Kennedy became the 
median justice).106  This puts Kennedy in a strong position to influence the 
Court’s final vote in close cases.  As Figure 1 indicates, Kennedy was more 
likely to insert dignity into majority opinions than concurring opinions, and 
the least likely to mention dignity in dissent.  Moreover, Figure 1 captures 
the impact of O’Connor’s absence, which solidified Kennedy as the median 
justice.  Without O’Connor on the Court, Kennedy wrote more majority and 
concurring opinions concerning dignity and fewer dissents than he did when 
she was still on the Court. 
Figure 1: 
Not only does Kennedy mention dignity more often in opinions after 
O’Connor’s retirement, he does so more often in narrowly divided cases than 
in cases with high concordance among the justices.  Figure 2 depicts the 
number of cases where Kennedy mentions dignity by vote and by opinion 
?
 106.  See Table A in the Appendix for a breakdown of the most likely median justice for all of 
these Court terms, and for the number and types of dignity opinions Kennedy wrote in these terms. 
While Kennedy mentions dignity fairly consistently across his time on the Court, he does so more 
often and in more majority opinions when he is the median justice, and more so after O’Connor 
retires (strongly solidifying his position as the Court’s median justice).  Additionally, at the time of 
writing, the Martin-Quinn scores were not yet available for the 2017-2018 term, so the information 
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type.  Although Kennedy mentions dignity in many types of cases, he is more 
likely to discuss it where the Court is split compared to when they are in 
agreement.  Moreover, he was more likely to discuss dignity in these divided 
cases after O’Connor’s retirement. 
Figure 2: 
Looking solely at those cases that were decided by one vote we can see 
just how important Kennedy’s institutional position was for allowing him to 
write his conception of dignity into law.  Figure 3 shows the dignity 
references by opinion in cases decided by one-vote.  As shown, Kennedy 
was far more likely to discuss dignity in a majority opinion (15 of his one-
vote dignity opinions) than in a concurring or dissenting opinion (4, each, of 
his one-vote dignity opinions).  This is especially true after O’Connor’s 
retirement where we see Kennedy’s one-vote majority dignity opinions jump 
from 4 to 11, despite this period being shorter (January 31, 2006-end of the 
2017-2018 term) than the time he spent on the Court with O’Connor 
(February 1988-January 31, 2006).  While his concurrences mentioning 
dignity stayed the same regardless of O’Connor’s presence, he mentions 
dignity in dissent in a narrowly-divided case only once after she left, 
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Figure 3: 
We argue that these numbers strongly suggest that Kennedy was able 
to use his institutional position as a median justice (especially as this position 
was solidified after O’Connor’s retirement) to write dignity into the law 
through is opinions.  He did so more often as median justice than not, but 
also more often in narrowly divided cases.  As the median justice, and thus 
the swing vote, he was able to use his position to control the case outcome, 
and to insert his understanding of dignity into the law through majority 
opinions. 
Part of this institutional position also accounts for seniority.  By custom, 
the chief justice or the most senior justice in the majority assigns the opinion 
writer in a case.  As the median justice, Kennedy’s vote could swing the case 
one way or the other, and one means of keeping him in the majority was to 
assign the opinion to him.  This could account for the increase in his majority 
opinions after O’Connor’s retirement.  Another factor is the retirement of 
Justice John Paul Stevens on June 29, 2010.  Without Stevens on the Court, 
Kennedy was the most senior justice while voting with the so-called liberal 
wing of the Court.  After Justice Scalia’s death in 2016, Kennedy became 
the senior associate justice, outranked only by Chief Justice Roberts.  Each 
of these changes further strengthened Kennedy’s institutional position.  Each 
change made it more likely that he would either assign close opinions to 
himself, or that assigning justices were incentivized to assign close cases to 
Kennedy.  Table 3 lists the assigning justices and cases for each of the 15 
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Putting aside Casey for a moment due the problems with discussing 
assignment, we see that Rehnquist assigned two institutional dignity cases to 
Kennedy, both touching on sovereignty.  Stevens assigned Kennedy three 
cases, all of which were government interference dignity cases relating in 
one way or another to the death penalty.  These assignments show Rehnquist 
shoring up the conservative block with Kennedy in the two sovereignty 
cases, and Stevens doing the same with the liberal block with the three death 
penalty cases.  Roberts did the same with the conservative block for the 
government interference dignity cases Gonzales v. Carhart107 (upholding the 
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act) and Ziglar v. Abbasi108 (with Justices 
Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch not participating, and the conservative 
justices on one side and Ginsburg and Breyer on the other), although 
Maryland v. King,109 a Fourth Amendment government interference dignity 
case, had a more mixed group with Kennedy joined by Roberts, Thomas, 
Breyer, and Alito.  Most of these one-vote cases have Kennedy writing about 
contentious legal issues for a largely ideologically consistent block of 
justices, and inserting his conception of dignity into each of those opinions. 
Table 3: 





Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania 
v. Casey (1992)110
3Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene 
Tribe of Idaho (1997)111
Alden v. Maine (1999)112
Stevens
Roper v. Simmons (2005)113
3
House v. Bell (2006)114
?
 107.  550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 108.  137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). 
 109.  133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). 
 110.  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 111.  521 U.S. 261.
 112.  527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 113.  543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 114.  547 US 518 (2006). 
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Kennedy v. Louisiana 
(2008)115
Kennedy
Brown v. Plata (2011)116
6
U.S. v. Windsor (2013)117
Hall v. Florida (2014)118
Obergefell v. Hodges 
(2015)119
Fisher v. University of 
Texas at Austin (2016)120
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado 
(2017)121
Roberts
Gonzales v. Carhart 
(2007)122
3
Maryland v. King (2013)123
Ziglar v. Abbasi (2017)124
Note: We follow the Supreme Court Database’s lead in listing Chief Justice Rehnquist as the 
assigning justice for Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992),125 relying in part on the justices’ 
docket books.126  Determining assigning justice is difficult here as three-member plurality 
claims joint authorship of the opinion and the other justices joined various parts, but none in 
whole.  Rehnquist ultimately files a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.  
When we look at the narrowly decided cases where Kennedy assigned 
himself the opinion, we see that they are all are fairly monumental decisions, 
and all pertain to dignity protections from governmental interference.  In 
Brown v. Plata,127 sees Kennedy upholding a finding that California prison 
overcrowding constitutes an Eight Amendment violation by virtue of 
?
 115.  554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
 116.  563 U.S. 493 (2011). 
 117.  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 118.  134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014). 
 119.  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 120.  579 U.S. 14 (2016). 
 121.  137 S. Ct. 855 (2017). 
 122.  550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 123.  133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). 
 124.  137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
 125.  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 126.  Spaeth et al., supra note 76.
 127.  563 U.S. 493 (2011). 
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allowing the suit to move forward.  Hall v. Florida 128 also involves the 
Eighth Amendment.  In his opinion, Kennedy declared the process of 
executing individuals with cognitive impairment unconstitutional.  As we 
have previously stated, Windsor129 and Obergefell130 pertain to equality 
protections for homosexuals in striking down portions of the Defense of 
Marriage Act of 1996 (“DOMA”),131 and upheld the right of same-sex 
couples to marry.  Finally, in Fisher,132 Kennedy finds no Fourteenth 
Amendment violation in the University of Texas at Austin’s consideration 
of race in determining admissions.  Here as the median justice, the swing 
vote, and the senior associate (for all but Plata (2011)133), Kennedy was able 
to self-assign these opinions and pursue his legal goals pertaining to his 
conception of dignity and what it means for various rights guarantees. 
Although Kennedy seemed to be capitalizing on his position as median 
justice in important ways, it is worth emphasizing that his attention to the 
concept of dignity was not new to his jurisprudence.  As we mentioned in 
the introduction, Kennedy discusses dignity in his confirmation hearings to 
become a Supreme Court justice.  Once on the Court, Kennedy has crafted 
at least one opinion invoking dignity in 25 of his 30 terms, starting with a 
dignity case in the 1988 term, which was his first full term on the Court.  Of 
these 25 terms with dignity opinions, all but 3 involve at least one majority 
opinion invoking dignity, this means that 22 of his 30 full terms on the Court 
involve creating at least one binding precedent that makes use of the concept 
of dignity.  Consequently, the development of this legal concept of dignity 
is not something he started after O’Connor left, or that he has implemented 
only as the term median justice (although he issued dignity opinions in 14.5 
of his terms as the median justice).  This was a concept he has developed 
over time, and as the median justice, has pursued increasingly in his 
opinions. 
While he had long worked on integrating dignity into case law, there is 
a decided uptick in how often Kennedy had done this since O’Connor has 
left the Court.  After O’Connor’s retirement, Kennedy is firmly the 
ideologically median justice for each of the Court’s terms, and he has the 
?
 128.  134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014). 
 129.  133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013). 
 130.  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 131.  Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1. 
U.S.C. § 7 (2000)).   
 132.  579 U.S. 14 (2016). 
 133.  563 U.S. 493, 493 (2011). 
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highest probability of all justices for being in the majority.134  In this period, 
Kennedy wrote 30 of his 54 dignity opinions, which included 22 majority 
opinions.  This means that over half of all of his dignity opinions, and over 
half of his dignity majority opinions came at a time when, institutionally 
speaking, his vote was the most important.  As shown above, this included 
11 majority opinions in one-vote cases since O’Connor’s retirement.  Dignity 
comes up in only two of Kennedy’s dissents after O’Connor retires, and only 
once in a one-vote case.  The remaining dignity opinions include three 
concurring opinions, two concurring in part and concurring in the judgment 
opinions, and one concurring in the judgment opinion. 
At first glance, it seems Kennedy was using his institutionally unique, 
and important, position to shape the Court’s precedents to include his 
conception of dignity.  However, the fact that his use of dignity spans a much 
larger period suggests that it is about much more than manipulating his 
institutional position or about following policy preferences.  Kennedy’s 
conception of dignity and his attempts to ascribe it in law are about more 
than politics and policy, as they also reflect a concern for law and doctrine.  
As the median justice, Kennedy had the benefit of being able to shape the 
legal opinions, not just policy outcomes, of close rulings from the Court.  As 
someone who has long articulated a belief in a greater role for dignity in 
shaping the law, he is strategically situated to accomplish this goal.  Legal 
goals and motivations must be factored in when considering the institutional 
role and power of median justices, with Kennedy’s development of dignity 
as a legal concept as an example. 
Conclusion
We have provided reasons to believe that Kennedy has pursued his 
concept of dignity as a legal goal across a variety of legal issues.  We also 
present evidence to suggest that Kennedy is using his institutional position 
as median justice not just to pursue policy, but to follow legal motivations in 
shaping doctrine.  Our content analysis, while not primarily about all of the 
ways Kennedy uses dignity in his opinions, does allow us to reach certain 
conclusions about Kennedy’s dignity jurisprudence. 
First, much of it is about figuring out what is owed to individuals and 
where the state’s power runs into the protective wall of dignity.  Kennedy 
struggles to articulate important dignitary concerns, but these do not always 
override state concerns.  In this way, Kennedy is not simply using “dignity” 
to pursue preferred policy outcomes, or as a catch-all term for a limitation 
?
 134.  As shown in the Appendix, the Martin-Quinn Scores for Kennedy for each term (and the 
remaining half-term from the 2005 term) after O’Connor’s retirement place him firmly as the term 
median justice.  
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on state power.  Kennedy’s abortion jurisprudence provides a vivid example 
of how he fully acknowledges the importance of bodily autonomy and choice 
for dignity concerns, but is also willing to uphold at least some abortion 
restrictions as either not infringing on women’s dignity135 or because of his 
concerns for the dignity of human life regarding a fetus.136  Similar points 
can be made regarding Kennedy’s use of dignity in Fourth Amendment 
cases, where he can acknowledge dignity interests but still uphold certain 
searches as non-violations of these concerns.137
Second, while complex and not guaranteed protections from state 
power, it seems that dignity for Kennedy does involve some degree of 
negative liberty from state overreach.  It speaks to what the government is 
prohibited from doing, and thus certain areas where the government must not 
interfere with private, personal decisions.  Lawrence138 and Obergefell139
seem to fit into this category of dignity elements, as both involve rejections 
of state attempts to police sex acts and intimate relationships, including the 
solidification of a loving relationship in the bonds of marriage. 
Finally, Kennedy’s concept of dignity clearly involves a strong 
component of equal treatment.  Not just focusing on that with which the 
government may not interfere, but also looking at the treatment we are owed 
or how the government may conceive of us.  Again, the Fourth Amendment 
search and seizure cases fit here, but so to do the Eighth Amendment cruel 
and unusual punishment cases.  In these cases, Kennedy addresses what fair, 
equal, and dignified treatment of individuals requires, including those either 
already in prison140 or those who have been sentenced to death.141  Kennedy’s 
position on the Court has allowed him to write this version of dignity into 
law. 
However, this element of dignity also applies to unacceptable ways in 
which the government might seek to reduce people to a single element of 
their existence, especially for purposes of discrimination.  This was clearly 
on display in the rejection of DOMA in U.S. v. Windsor (2013),142 but also 
?
 135.  See Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 US 502 (1990); Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
136.  See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 137.  See generally Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013); City of Ontario, Cal. v. 
Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010); Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1958; Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002). 
 138.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 139.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 140.  See Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474 (2010); Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011). 
 141.  See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 142.  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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in various opinions touching on race.  This consideration for not simplifying 
people to one element allows Kennedy to reject the use of sex- and race-
based preemptory challenges,143 but also race-based voting restrictions in 
Hawaii enacted to protect native Hawaiians,144 or to question affirmative 
action policies as potentially destructive of equal treatment and equal 
dignity.145  For Kennedy, a respect of human dignity means not being 
discriminated against because of who you are, nor being overly simplified to 
one element of your identity.  Kennedy’s concept of dignity involves 
elements of due process, but also life, liberty, and equality.  All of these 
elements have been reflected in Kennedy’s majority opinions employing his 
concept of dignity. 
Justice Kennedy’s position as median voter, especially after Justice 
O’Connor’s retirement, allows Kennedy to expand upon his concept of 
dignity and not just for preferred policy goals.  Kennedy’s use of dignity 
seems to reflect the ideas he expressed regarding dignity in his confirmation 
hearings.  While not conclusive, and certainly an area for future studies, this 
suggests continuity to Kennedy’s thinking about dignity’s place within our 
law.146  His institutional position allowed him to write dignity into the 
Court’s precedents.  Moreover, as his use of dignity gained more outside 
attention, in particular from the media in response to his opinion for the Court 
in Obergefell the potential for expanded legal effect of this concept of dignity 
exists.  As we have argued, Kennedy’s unique position on the Court as the 
median justice allows him to pursue legal considerations, including his 
seemingly idiosyncratic conception of dignity.  Kennedy provides an 
example of how median justices can use their position to not only pursue 
policy and political outcomes, but also legal considerations through attempts 
to shape legal doctrine.  For Justice Kennedy, dignity in its various 
manifestations appears to be one such legal consideration. 
?
 143.  See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. 
TB, 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). 
 144.  See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000). 
 145.  See Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 579 U.S. 14 (2016); Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Schuette v. Coal. to 
Defend Affirmative Action (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). 
 146.  See COLUCCI, supra note 24; KNOWLES, supra note 24. 
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Appendix 

















1988 White 0.89 1 1
1989 White 0.98 1 2 3
1990 Souter 0.53 3 3
1991 O'Connor 0.30 1 1
1992 O'Connor 0.59 0
1993 Kennedy 0.68 1 1
1994 O'Connor 0.52 1 1 
1995 Kennedy 0.68 1 1
1996 Kennedy 0.68 1 1
1997 Kennedy 0.82 0
1998 Kennedy 0.56 1 1 2
1999 O'Connor 0.76 1 2 3 
2000 O'Connor 0.92 0
2001 O'Connor 0.99 1 1
2002 O'Connor 0.98 2 2
2003 O'Connor 0.98 1 1 
2004 O'Connor 0.93 2 2
2005a O'Connor 0.86 0
2005b Kennedy 0.99 2 2
2006 Kennedy 1.00 1 2 3
2007 Kennedy 1.00 2 2
2008 Kennedy 1.00 0
2009 Kennedy 1.00 1 2 1 4 
2010 Kennedy 0.99 3 1 4
2011 Kennedy 1.00 1 1
2012 Kennedy 1.00 3 3
2013 Kennedy 0.99 2 1 3
2014 Kennedy 1.00 3 1 4 
2015 Kennedy 0.98 1 1
2016 Kennedy 0.91 2   2 
2017 Kennedy .50 2   2 
   
   Total 54 
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Occurring Three or More 
Times 
Occurring Three or More 
Times 
Frequency Collocate Frequency Collocate 
12 persons 6 state 
9 respect 6 respect 
9 personal 6 court 
9 human 3 states 
8 all 3 sovereign* 
7 equal 3 preserve 
6 same 3 foreign 
6 central 3 affront 
5 protection 3 afforded 
5 own 2* sovereignty 
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Table B presents a collocate analysis for words within five words of 
Kennedy’s use of dignity performed as part of a Key Words in Context 
(KWIC) analysis.  The data in Table B is limited to those words that show 
up at least three times near one of Kennedy’s uses of dignity, while excluding 
articles, conjunctions, and prepositions for the sake of clarity.  The 
exceptions, marked with an * above, are that we included “sovereignty” and 
“sovereigns” to accompany “sovereign,” even though Kennedy does not use 
sovereigns or sovereign at least three times (twice and once, respectively).  
We included these as they are variations of sovereign, which Kennedy does 
use three times near dignity, and it is an important aspect to institutional 
dignity for Kennedy. 
We ran the KWIC and collocates analyses to compare how Kennedy 
was presenting “dignity” in the cases we identified as pertaining to 
“government interference” dignity and “institutional dignity.”  While we are 
not exploring the contours and full meaning of dignity for Kennedy in this 
piece, we include this analysis as a check to see if “dignity” is a coherent 
enough legal concept for Kennedy—again, without fully exploring what this 
concept means for Kennedy here—to justify our use of this legal concept, 
and of Kennedy, as an example of how a median justice can use his or her 
institutional position to pursue legal goals.  For the purpose of this analysis 
we are looking for rough consistency to suggest, as we suspect, that there is 
consistency to how Kennedy discusses dignity in his opinions for the 
Supreme Court.147
More of Kennedy’s dignity opinions address the government 
interference strand of dignity rather than institutional dignity, and thus there 
are more entries for collocates for this more-common form of dignity.  
However, both sets of words indicate a focus on inherent value to both 
individuals and institutions of which dignity is a part.  “Respect” is a 
common element to how Kennedy discusses both forms of dignity, and we 
see focus on “persons,” “humans,” and “all” for government interference 
dignity, and “state” and “states” for institutional dignity, suggesting common 
levels of focus in each area, just on a different scale.  In many ways, these 
uses track with how Kennedy discussed the concept of dignity in his Senate 
confirmation hearings, as we discuss in our introduction.  We argue that the 
collocates, as well as a review of the overall KWIC analysis indicates enough 
consistency for how Kennedy presents dignity in these two areas that treating 
“dignity” as a valid, consistent legal concept for Kennedy is justified in the 
context of the present study.148
?
 147.  See COLUCCI, supra note 24; KNOWLES, supra note 24. 
 148.  See Tribe, supra note 21. 
